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## CARRANCISTA PROPAGANDA AND THE PRINT MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW OF INSTITUTIONS

**D**espite the voluminous body of historical literature devoted to the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and U.S.-Mexican diplomatic relations, few works address the subject of revolutionary propaganda.<sup>1</sup> During this tumultuous era, however, factional leaders recognized the importance of justifying their movement, publicizing their activities, and cultivating favorable public opinion for their cause, particularly in the United States. In this regard, Venustiano Carranza was especially energetic. From the inception of his Constitutionalist revolution, Carranza and his adherents persistently attempted to exploit the press to generate support among Mexican expatriates, protect Mexican sovereignty, secure recognition from the administration of Woodrow Wilson, gain the acquiescence—if not the blessing—of key sectors of the North American public for his Constitutionalist program, enhance his personal image, and defend his movement against the criticism and intrigues of his enemies—both Mexican and North American.

\* The author wishes to express his gratitude to the Oklahoma Foundation for the Humanities and to the Department of History and College of Arts and Sciences, Oklahoma State University, for their generous financial assistance.

<sup>1</sup> One of the few monographic studies of the revolutionary era offering more than passing reference to propaganda activities is Douglas W. Richmond's *Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle, 1893-1920* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 190-192. Other works discussing the topic include Juan Gómez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna, México en Aztlán y Aztlán en México: Chicano-Mexican Relations and the Mexican Consulates, 1900-1920," in James W. Wilkie, *et al.*, eds., *Contemporary Mexico, Papers of the IV International Conference of Mexican Historians* (Berkeley and Mexico City: University of California Press and El Colegio de México, 1976), 494-527; Richard Griswold del Castillo, "The Mexican Revolution and the Spanish-Language Press in the Borderlands," *Journalism History*, 4:2 (Summer 1977): 42-47; Michael M. Smith, "The Mexican Immigrant Press Beyond the Borderlands: The Case of *El Cosmopolita*, 1914-1919," *Great Plains Quarterly* X:2, 71-85; and Michael M. Smith, "The Mexican Revolution in Kansas City: Jack Danciger vs. the Colonia Elite," *Kansas History* 14:3 (Autumn 1991): 206-218.

To advance this multifaceted agenda, *carrancistas* engaged lobbyists and publicists, created departments of information, operated their own news services, and established or subsidized newspapers, magazines, and other publications. The purpose of the present study is to provide a brief overview of the origins, goals, structure, functions, and key figures of the principal institutions designed to promote *carrancismo* through the Spanish- and English-language press in the United States from the commencement of the Constitutionalist revolt in 1913 to the demise of Carranza's regime in 1920. Before discussing the development of these institutions, however, it is necessary to outline briefly the circumstances in which they emerged.

Venustiano Carranza clearly recognized that President Woodrow Wilson and powerful interest groups in the United States resented his fierce nationalism, ostensible anti-*yanquismo*, independent position in international affairs, and agenda of reform. The unremitting violence of factional warfare in Mexico, the destruction of lives and property, and the threat to United States security along the border exacerbated hostility toward Carranza and provoked repeated demands for direct United States military intervention. Indeed, as a result of a dispute with Victoriano Huerta, the man who had manipulated the overthrow and murder of President Francisco I. Madero and precipitated Carranza's rebellion, Wilson ordered United States marines to occupy the port of Veracruz in April 1914.

The Constitutionalist movement also faced a daunting array of Mexican adversaries in the United States. Personal ambitions and substantive philosophical differences had nurtured irreconcilable factional disputes since the rebellion against Porfirio Díaz in 1910. *Científicos*, *magonistas*, *vasquistas*, *huertistas*, *felicistas*, *orozquistas*, and others who contested Carranza's leadership fled their homeland and opposed him from presumed sanctuary in the United States. Francisco "Pancho" Villa of Chihuahua broke with the First Chief in November 1914 and remained his most potent rival. Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916 prompted Wilson to send the Punitive Expedition into Mexico and nearly precipitated a war between the two countries.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The number of general and monographic works dealing with the Revolution, factional strife, and U.S.-Mexican relations during the period under consideration is vast and varied. The following selection is offered merely as a sampling of the standard works in English: Stanley R. Ross, *Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Charles C. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972); Michael C. Meyer, *Huerta: A Political Portrait* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972) and *Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution, 1910-1915* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967); John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Peter V.N. Henderson, *Félix Díaz, the Porfirians and the Mexican Revolution* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska

Establishing bases of operation in such places as San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Antonio, El Paso, New Orleans, and New York, anti-Constitutionalist elements incessantly conspired, raised funds, recruited soldiers, smuggled weapons and supplies, and launched raids into Mexico from various points along the border. Carranza's enemies found moral and financial support from a variety of North American opponents of the Revolution. One of the most outspoken, Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico, had close financial and personal ties to members of the old regime and participated in schemes to oust Carranza.<sup>3</sup> Powerful capitalists such as Edward L. Doheny, William Randolph Hearst, Harrison Gray Otis, William P. Wrigley, and other North American investors in Mexican petroleum, minerals, land, and businesses sought to protect or extend their interests at the expense of the Carranza regime and Mexican sovereignty. Catholics in the United States, outraged at revolutionary anti-clericalism and alleged atrocities committed against priests and nuns, bitterly fought recognition of the Constitutionalist government.<sup>4</sup>

*Carrancistas* particularly resented the negative public opinion their adversaries generated against them in the United States. Opposition groups

Press, 1981) and *Mexican Exiles in the Borderlands, 1910-1913* (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1979); Kenneth J. Grieb, *The United States and Huerta* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969); Robert E. Quirk, *An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz*, (New York: Norton and Company, 1962) and his *The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention of Aguascalientes* (New York: Citadel Press, 1963); Clarence C. Clendenen, *The United States and Pancho Villa* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961); Mark T. Gilderhus, *Diplomacy and Revolution: U.S.-Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977); P. Edward Haley, *Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico: 1910-1917* (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press, 1970); Linda B. Hall, *Alvaro Obregón: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981); Friedrich Katz, *The Secret War in Mexico* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); E.V. Niemeyer, Jr., *Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); and Richmond, *Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle*.

<sup>3</sup> Friedrich Katz, "El Espionaje Mexicano en Estados Unidos durante la Revolución," *Eslabones: Revista Semestral de Estudios Regionales* 2(Julio-Diciembre, 1991): 15. This issue of *Eslabones* contains several good articles on the subject for the period under consideration. In January 1917, a Mexican secret agent attached to the El Paso consulate intercepted a compromising letter from Charles P. Hunt to Villa. Mexican Ambassador Bonillas forwarded a copy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noting that Secretary of State Robert Lansing said that Fall denied any involvement and declared that Hunt was "crazy." Ignacio Bonillas to Ernesto Garza Pérez, Washington, D.C., 9 April 1917, L-E-838, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, México, D.F. (hereafter cited as AHSRE), pp. 1-4; Gilderhus, *Diplomacy and Revolution*, p. 73; Douglas W. Richmond, "Intentos Externos para Derrocar al Régimen de Carranza (1915-1920)," *Historia Mexicana* 32:1(Julio-Septiembre, 1981): 117.

<sup>4</sup> For a recent study of one of the leading Catholic critics of Revolution and a man who apparently plotted with major American investors and anti-Carranza Mexican reactionaries, see Sandra Kay Unruh, "Francis Clement Kelley and the Mexican Revolution," (M.A. thesis, Oklahoma State University, 1993), particularly pp. 58-111.

issued a persistent barrage of propaganda in the English- and Spanish-language press in an effort to discredit the Constitutionalist movement and enhance their own position. They produced their most important publications in San Antonio, El Paso, and Los Angeles.

Anti-Carranza papers predominated in San Antonio's large Spanish-speaking community. Ignacio Lozano's *La Prensa*, a daily newspaper with the widest circulation of any Spanish-language publication in the United States, was uniformly anti-revolutionary; *El Imparcial de Texas*, owned by Francisco A. Chapa, a prominent, naturalized Mexican immigrant, first supported Victoriano Huerta and later backed Félix Díaz; Nemesio García Naranjo, former Minister of Education in Huerta's cabinet, published the weekly *Revista Mexicana*, a magazine of unremitting reactionary sympathies. Less influential anti-Carranza papers in San Antonio included *El Presente* and *Claridades*, among others.<sup>5</sup>

In El Paso, whose expatriate community rose to over 30,000 during this period, J. Francisco Lozoya's *Mexico Libre* defended Huerta, while Silvestre Terrazas's *La Patria* stridently supported Villa. The most important anti-Carranza newspaper in the city, however, was the *El Paso Morning Times*. This daily paper enjoyed extensive circulation on either side of the border and published both English- and Spanish-language editions. In August 1915, an agent of Pancho Villa secretly paid manager Wych E. Greer \$10,000 to support the Chihuahua chieftain. He supplied an additional \$250-a-week payoff to the director of its Spanish edition.<sup>6</sup>

In Los Angeles, Ricardo Flores Magón and Anselmo Figueroa produced *Regeneración*, probably the most famous Spanish-language newspaper of the era. Their strident anarchism, advocacy of direct revolutionary action, and demands for the total destruction of the existing order were inimical to Carranza's moderately reformist philosophy. *El Herald de México*, owned by Juan de Heras, published by César F. Marburg, and financed by Estéban Cantú, had a circulation of approximately 4000. While staunchly national-

<sup>5</sup> Gómez-Quinones, "Piedras contra la Luna," p. 516; Griswold del Castillo, "The Mexican Revolution and the Spanish-Language Press in the Borderlands," pp. 42-47; Antimanco Sax, *Los Mexicanos en el Destierro* (San Antonio: n.p., 1916), pp. 54-59; Adolfo Carrillo to Venustiano Carranza, Los Angeles, California, 29 Julio 1915, Manuscritos de don Venustiano Carranza. Fondo XX-I, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México, Fundación Cultural de Condamex, México, D.F. (hereafter cited as VC), doc. 5102; Carlos Meade Fierro to Venustiano Carranza, 1 Julio 1915, VC, doc. 4771; Teóduo R. Beltrán to Venustiano Carranza, 6 Mayo 1915, VC, doc. 4163; see a copy of the *Revista Mexicana*, III:56 in L-E-798, AHSRE.

<sup>6</sup> "Sobre Subvención de Dlls. 10.000 al Gerente de 'El Paso Morning,' por Francisco Villa," L-E-799(11), AHSRE, pp. 1-3.

istic in its orientation and devoted to the protection of the rights of Mexicans in the Los Angeles *barrio*, *El Heraldo* forcefully opposed Carranza.<sup>7</sup>

Constitutionalists also denounced what they considered to be the biased, anti-Mexican reporting of North American correspondents, newspapers, and wire services, particularly the Associated Press and International News Service. While expressing resentment at the consistently hostile tone of such papers as Harry Chandler's Los Angeles *Times*, *carrancistas* reserved their bitterest invective for the "exaggerated," "sensationalist," "imperialistic" "yellow press" of William Randolph Hearst.<sup>8</sup> The publishing mogul, who owned vast properties in Mexico, was an uncompromising foe of the Revolution and ardent interventionist. *Carrancistas* charged that Hearst's correspondents in Mexico submitted false and libelous stories through his International News Service and that his influential chain of newspapers and magazines published inflammatory distortions of the truth and insulting depictions of Mexicans, Carranza, and his government.<sup>9</sup>

The virtual monopoly that hostile United States wire services and newspapers held over the transmission and dissemination of material regarding Mexican affairs greatly circumscribed Carranza's ability to promote his cause through existing conduits of information. He also faced a number of obstacles in his attempt to reach Mexican expatriates through *colonia* newspapers. Most Spanish-language publications served proportionally small, economically weak, and typically poorly-educated ethnic communities. They usually rested on a precarious financial base, enjoyed only restricted circulation, and commonly failed unless they received substantial subventions. *Carrancistas* understood, therefore, that in order to promote their cause effectively it was imperative to devise their own means of creating,

<sup>7</sup> A controversial recent study of the *mañonista* movement and the impact of *Regeneración* is James A. Sandos, *Rebellion in the Borderlands* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); Griswold del Castillo, "The Mexican Revolution and the Spanish-Language Press in the Borderlands," pp. 42-43; Ramón D. Chacón, "The Chicano Immigrant Press in Los Angeles: The Case of 'El Heraldo de México,' 1916-1920," *Journalism History* 4:2 (Summer 1977): pp. 48-50, 62-64.

<sup>8</sup> For a representative sample of complaints, see Adolfo Carrillo to Venustiano Carranza, Los Angeles, California, 22 Septiembre 1914, VC, doc. 1583; Heriberto Barrón to Félix F. Palavicini, New Orleans, Louisiana, 2 Mayo 1915, VC, doc. 4105; W.F. Valderrama to Venustiano Carranza, Chicago, Illinois, 15 Junio 1915, VC, doc. 4632; Ernesto Meade Fierro [?] to Venustiano Carranza, San Antonio, Texas, 1 Julio 1915, VC, doc. 4771; Manuel Carpio to Venustiano Carranza, Chicago, Illinois, 2 Noviembre 1915, VC, doc. 6543; and Venustiano Carranza to Virginia Garza, México, D.F., 29 Marzo 1917, VC, doc. 12752.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, Willebaldo Izaguirre to Rafaél Zubarán Capmany, San Francisco, California, 14 Enero 1914, VC, doc. 754; Eliseo Arredondo to Robert Lansing, Washington, D.C., 12 April 1916, Expediente 17-9-160, AHSRE, p. 1; Cándido Aguilar to Ignacio Bonillas, México, D.F., 18 Junio 1918, Expediente 18-1-58, AHSRE, p. 2.

transmitting, and disseminating favorable news. Such organizations could spread “the truth” about the Revolution; defend its goals, programs and leadership; and influence public opinion.<sup>10</sup>

In March 1913, Venustiano Carranza formalized his rebellion against Huerta when he issued the *Plan de Guadalupe*, designating himself as “First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.” He forged an alliance with other groups led by Pancho Villa in Chihuahua and Alvaro Obregón of Sonora and soon thereafter sent Roberto V. Pesqueira and other agents to the United States to promote the Constitutionalist movement and secure recognition of the rebels’ belligerency. Pesqueira worked closely with Sherburne G. Hopkins, a Washington, D.C. lawyer and an important, yet shadowy, figure in Mexican revolutionary affairs. While Hopkins acted as the Constitutionalist’s legal counsel, lobbyist, and confidential agent, the precise details of the services he rendered to earn his \$50,000 fee remain unclear.<sup>11</sup>

An aspect of Hopkins’s role, and one in which he enjoyed considerable success, was that of molding favorable public opinion for the Constitutionalist cause. He succeeded in this endeavor by using his contacts in the United States press, which he had earlier cultivated while serving as an agent of the *maderista* revolution. Hopkins received daily reports from Mexico City or El Paso describing victories of the Constitutionalist armies or alleged atrocities of Huerta’s *federales* and supplied them to journalists. He also prepared public statements regarding significant issues of the day and then secured their publication in friendly papers for rebel leaders or their agents. His efforts were so successful that the *huertista* representative in Washington urged his government to establish a similar agency.<sup>12</sup>

The achievements of Constitutionalist agents along the border rivalled the results of Hopkins’s efforts in Washington. In June 1914, *huertista* consuls in such places as Del Río, El Paso, Douglas, Tucson, San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco reported that *carrancista* propagandists enjoyed a seemingly limitless supply of money and had developed considerable support and sympathy among both Mexican and Anglo residents in their

<sup>10</sup> In addition to the works regarding the Spanish-language press already cited, see also Robert E. Park, *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1922), pp. 309-324; and Manuel Gamio, *Mexican Immigration to the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 136-139.

<sup>11</sup> Gilderhus, *Revolution and Diplomacy*, p. 6; “Sherburne G. Hopkins. Su expediente,” 3-16-2, AHSRE, p. 49f; Testimony of Sherburne G. Hopkins, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*, U.S. Congress, Senate, 66th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1919-1920), (hereafter cited as IMA), 2:2411-2419.

<sup>12</sup> Alberto L. Godoy to Arturo M. Elías, Washington, D.C., 17 Junio 1914, L-E-813, AHSRE, 186-187.



districts. The consular officials expressed a willingness to mount campaigns of their own but complained that they lacked sufficient funds to do so.<sup>13</sup>

After Hopkins severed his relationship with Carranza in September 1914, Roberto V. Pesqueira, Modesto C. Rolland, and other confidential agents took the lead in promoting *carrancismo*.<sup>14</sup> By this time, Carranza had driven Huerta from power, appointed Eliseo Arredondo as his confidential agent in Washington, and retained Washington attorney Charles A. Douglas to succeed Hopkins. He also replaced *huertistas* with his own men in Mexican consulates throughout the United States. In addition to their normal duties, consular officials served the government and military by supplying intelligence data, acquiring arms and munitions, and providing food and other supplies. To mobilize community support for the Constitutionalist cause, they fostered the development of political and ethnic societies, addressed civic groups, contributed articles to local newspapers, and cultivated friendly relations with politicians, law enforcement personnel, and commercial associations. Their position also permitted consuls to play a key role in Carranza's propaganda initiatives.<sup>15</sup>

Pesqueira and Rolland established two important, and apparently competing, agencies to further *carrancismo*. In August 1914, Rolland, assisted by Carlo di Fornaro, had organized the Mexican Bureau of Information in conjunction with the Constitutionalist Commercial Agency in New York. The Bureau produced articles for magazines and other publications and issued a biweekly bulletin in English entitled the "Mexican Letter." Generally two or three pages in length, the bulletins included a variety of news notes and commentary upon important events and personalities, as well as an explanation of the significance of the Revolution and the Constitutionalist plan for pacification and reconstruction. The Bureau sent the reports to President Wilson, all members of the House and Senate, and numerous other public officials. They also distributed the bulletins free of charge to approximately 500 newspapers across the country.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> See, for example, P. Castello to Visitador General de Consulados, Del Río, Texas, 17 Junio 1914, pp. 150; Arturo M. Elías to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, El Paso, Texas, 22 Junio 1914, pp. 13-17; G. Ramonet to Arturo M. Elías, Douglas, Arizona, 14 Junio 1914, pp. 169-172; José Salas Díaz to Visitador General de Consulados, Tucson, Arizona, 16 Junio 1914, pp. 130-131; Francisco B. Barrón to Arturo M. Elías, San Diego, California, 16 Junio 1914, pp. 161-164; Juan C. Orci to Arturo M. Elías, Los Angeles, California, 13 Junio 1914, pp. 118-119; and A. León Grajeda to Arturo M. Elías, San Francisco, California, 15 Junio 1914, pp. 212-214; all in L-E-813, AHSRE.

<sup>14</sup> Testimony of Sherburne G. Hopkins, IMA, 2:2411.

<sup>15</sup> Gilderhus, *Revolution and Diplomacy*, p. 19; Richmond, *Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle*, p. 189; Gómez-Quíñones, "Piedras contra la Luna," *passim*.

<sup>16</sup> Modesto C. Rolland to Venustiano Carranza, New York, 19 Agosto 1914, VC, doc. 1282; Modesto



In a more ambitious scheme, Pesqueira created the Pan American News Service (PANS), an international wire service operating as a division of Carranza's department of foreign affairs. Utilizing the international cable and telegraph system, Pesqueira sought to link the Constitutionalist government to all sections of the United States by establishing local offices of the PANS in every city containing a Mexican consulate. In most cases, the consul or superior officials in Mexico disbursed the necessary operational funds.

The PANS agency in Mexico transmitted information to Galveston and El Paso; from there it was relayed to cities containing a branch office. Local departments telegraphed information to one another, appropriate diplomatic officials in the United States, or to the PANS office in Mexico. In addition to sending news items, the network also functioned as a channel for the transmission of confidential, encoded messages to Mexican political and military agents. While Rolland's Mexican Bureau of Information targeted a predominantly English-speaking constituency, the PANS focused largely upon a Spanish-speaking audience. Local PANS agents supplied data to consular officials and Spanish-language newspapers throughout the various consular districts.<sup>17</sup>

Although Pesqueira's vision and initiative were impressive and his grand scheme promising, in practice, results were disappointing. Critics complained that the system was too expensive and inefficient; they alleged, furthermore, that Pesqueira and his employees squandered the funds allocated for the service and accomplished little. A major handicap was the organization's obvious connection to the Constitutionalist government. According to Rolland, many perceived the PANS as merely a source of "official information" and "disinformation" rather than reliable news.<sup>18</sup>

As a result, in March 1915, Carranza contracted Joseph Branyas, a Spanish journalist residing in New Orleans, to reorganize his information services in the United States. While presumably intended to function in a manner broadly similar to that of the PANS, Branyas' operation was to maintain an appearance of absolute independence, with no visible ties to the regime. From its headquarters in New York, Branyas' organization would

Rolland to Jesús Urueta, Veracruz, 23 enero 1915, in "Modesto C. Rolland. Su expediente." 5-7-19, AHSRE, p. 12; for examples of the "Mexican Letter," see VC, docs. 1558, 2246, 2295, 3662, 4233; Enríquez to Venustiano Carranza, New York, 11 Diciembre 1914, VC, doc. 2200.

<sup>17</sup> There are literally thousands of telegrams and other documents scattered throughout the AHSRE related to the Pan American News Service. One gets a fairly good idea of its activities from the telegrams and correspondence found in L-E-836, AHSRE, *passim*.

<sup>18</sup> Modesto Rolland to Venustiano Carranza, New York, 3 Agosto 1916, VC, doc. 10118.

also undertake the ambitious task of producing a newspaper for national circulation, the only Spanish-language paper in the United States specifically designed to reach such an extensive audience. Carranza agreed to allocate \$10,000 to install the printing press and offices and up to \$9,000 a month thereafter. Branyas, however, died before he could institute the new system.<sup>19</sup>

A major function of the *carrancista* information service was to supply a variety of materials to the scores of friendly or independent Spanish-language newspapers throughout the border region. In addition to authorized news items, *carrancistas* distributed pictures and biographical sketches of leading political and military figures, official statistical data, and copies of revolutionary laws, proclamations, and programs.<sup>20</sup> Mexican consuls typically had the responsibility for cultivating favorable press in their districts, and most received an allocation from the foreign office to subsidize newspapers that aided the Constitutionalist cause.

Consuls Andrés G. García in El Paso, Adolfo Carrillo in Los Angeles, Ramón P. De Negri in San Francisco, and Teódulo R. Beltrán in San Antonio allocated thousands of dollars each month to subsidized papers in their districts. The following represent only a few of the most important avowedly partisan *carrancista* newspapers receiving financial assistance from Mexican consuls: *El Paso del Norte*, an El Paso, Texas, daily owned by Fernando Gamiochipi, received \$400 a month; in Los Angeles, *El Eco de México*, founded in May 1915 by Jorge U. Orozco and Roberto V. Pesqueira and later edited by Carlos Félix Díaz, received a monthly subsidy of \$650; Ernesto Meade Fierro edited *La Raza* in San Antonio, Texas, and secured a subvention of \$300 per month. Ramón P. De Negri contributed \$300 each month to Julio G. Arce's *El Mefistófeles* in San Francisco.<sup>21</sup> In addition to these major "official" organs, *carrancistas* directly assisted numerous others on a smaller scale. Periodicals such as *El Progreso* of Laredo and *La Prensa* and *El Rebelde* in Los Angeles received up to \$100 per month. In other cases, consuls merely agreed to purchase subscriptions

<sup>19</sup> Urueta to [?], Veracruz, 18 March 1915, L-E-730(2), AHSRE, p. 12; Manuel Garza M. to Ismaél Palafox, 12 Enero 1915, New Orleans, Louisiana; Expediente 17-20-98, AHSRE, pp. 1-2; Nicéforo Zambrano to Consul del Ejército Constitucionalista en NY, USA, Veracruz, 19 Abril 1915; Expediente 17-6-110, AHSRE, p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> Smith, "The Mexican Immigrant Press Beyond the Borderlands," p. 80.

<sup>21</sup> Gómez-Quifiones, "Piedras Contra la Luna," p. 516; Adolfo Carrillo to Venustiano Carranza, Los Angeles, California, 12 Mayo 1915, VC, doc. 4262; Cándido Aguilar to Rafael Nieto, México, 25 Septiembre 1916, "Andrés G. García. Su expediente." 3-6-12, AHSRE, p. 365.

or a number of copies of a particular issue for circulation to other Mexican consulates.<sup>22</sup>

In July 1915, after the Constitutionalists had crushed Villa in the Battle of Celaya and had taken control of Mexico City, they again endeavored to reorganize their propaganda apparatus in the United States. Alfredo Breceda, Carranza's aide and confidante, wrote from New York that criticism of the Constitutionalists had escalated since they had captured the capital. He complained that both Pesqueira's organization in New York and Arredondo's agents in Washington were ineffective. Pesqueira's people lacked credibility with the "serious press," and the Confidential Agency's exorbitant expenditures were unproductive. While he was in New York, however, Breceda had encountered Timothy Turner, a long-time reporter for the *El Paso Morning Times* and former Associated Press correspondent who had covered the Mexican Revolution since its inception. In fact, during the winter of 1913-1914, Turner had traveled with Carranza and his official entourage throughout Sonora and Sinaloa. Breceda invited Turner to prepare a prospectus for the reorganization of the Mexican Bureau of Information, and he readily accepted.<sup>23</sup>

In Turner's view, the Bureau's principal function was "to create through the constructive channels of publicity a true understanding of Mexican affairs." It would serve as "a permanent department for the defense of Mexico" against the false impression created in the world press and "assist in supplying Mexican newspapers with news material of the proper kind." The Bureau's central office would be located in New York City, near but not attached to the Mexican Consulate General. It would be directed by a North American newspaperman, who would have two assistants, one in Mexico with Carranza and the other with the Constitutionalist legation in Washington. The entire operation would be placed under the immediate authority of either the Secretary of Foreign Relations or the Chief of the General Con-

<sup>22</sup> Director de "El Progreso" to Venustiano Carranza, Laredo, Texas, 16 February 1915, VC, doc. 2893; Juan B. Vega to Rafael E. Múzquiz, Querétaro, 10 Marzo 1916, L-E-801(27), AHSRE, pp. 3-5; Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores to Juan T. Burns, México, D.F., 10 Marzo 1916, Expediente 11-18-222, AHSRE, pp. 1-3. Another important pro-Carranza paper was *El Cosmopolita* (Kansas City, Missouri), owned and published by local Anglo businessman and Honorary Mexican Consul, Jack Danciger. Danciger had close commercial ties to important Constitutionalist officials as well as to Mexican *colonias* throughout the Central Plains area. Although it is not known if Danciger received a subvention from the Mexican government, his paper staunchly defended the Carranza regime. See Smith, "The Mexican Immigrant Press Beyond the Borderlands," 73-74, 80-81; and Smith, "The Mexican Revolution in Kansas City," pp. 209-212, 214-218.

<sup>23</sup> Alfredo Breceda to Venustiano Carranza, New York, 22 Julio 1915, VC, doc. 5009; see Turner's autobiography, Timothy G. Turner, *Bullets, Bottles, and Gardenias* (Dallas, Texas: South-West Press, 1935), pp. 87-166.

sular Department, who would instruct the Bureau as to what results were desired and then permit its experts to devise the means of achieving them. Bureau personnel would function in a manner similar to that of publicity agents for any other nation or corporation; that is, they would merely suggest certain strategies to create a particular impression in the media.

The publicity department would also act as a bureau of information for the consular service. All news would pass through regular channels but be prepared by agents of the Bureau, who would engage in some independent occupation that furnished a cover for their true activities. The central office in New York would assist the Consul General in preparing material for release to the New York newspapers and national news services. The Washington agent would similarly aid Mexico's chief diplomatic representative. In matters of publicity, all consuls in the United States would follow instructions from the New York office and submit news items directly to it. The Director would prepare appropriate statements and forward them to the proper officials for release to the press. The Director would also send a summary to Carranza and any other interested Mexican authorities. Official news prepared in the Bureau office in Mexico would be issued by the proper authority and signed "Official Information Bureau;" telegrams from the New York agent transmitting or requesting information would be signed "General Consulate." Material released in this manner would be offered as "official information" and lack the appearance of "artificial propaganda."

Concomitant with its release of official news bulletins, the New York central agency could also provide a channel for confidential information exchanged between consular agents and Carranza's foreign relations office. This matter would be relayed, in code, from one office to another in exactly the same fashion as the public telegrams. Turner's arrangement possessed a number of advantages over the existing system. It was more economical, obviated the practice of subsidizing small periodicals, precluded the publication of unauthorized material, and systematized the flow of both public and confidential information.<sup>24</sup>

Carranza approved the project and ordered his secretary of foreign relations to oversee its operation and provide the necessary funds. Turner quickly moved to implement the new system. By the end of August he had established the central office of the Mexican Bureau of Information at 120 Broadway in New York City, placed his principal assistants in the Wash-

<sup>24</sup> Timothy Turner, "Prospectus for the Organization of an Official Bureau of Information of the Constitutionalist Government. . .," New York, 21 July 1915, Expediente L-E-811(1), AHSRE, . 15-17; for a Spanish version of the plan, see VC, doc. 5009.

ington D.C. and Veracruz agencies, and assembled their respective staffs. In October 1915, the Bureau and all Constitutionlists celebrated one of their first major diplomatic achievements—the Wilson administration's extension of *de facto* recognition to Carranza's government.

Timothy Turner's personal association with the Bureau was unexpectedly brief. In January 1916, Andrés G. García, Mexican Consul in El Paso, reported that one of his operatives had discovered proof that Turner had collected a monthly payoff of \$150 from Pancho Villa when he worked for the *El Paso Morning Times*. As a result, Turner was summarily removed as Director. Although the Bureau continued to operate after his dismissal, apparently its responsibilities were limited to transmitting only matter intended for public consumption.<sup>25</sup>

Villa's assault on Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916 precipitated the worst crisis in U.S.-Mexican relations since the War of 1846-1848. Villa's belated reply to Woodrow Wilson's recognition of Carranza was designed to provoke United States military intervention and the collapse of the Constitutionalist regime. Throughout the United States, critics of the Revolution and Wilson's policies toward Mexico demanded retaliation; in response, the President ordered the Punitive Expedition across the border. As a consequence, the Mexican government escalated its propaganda effort to defend the Constitutionalist revolution, calm the emotions both of United States citizens and Mexican expatriates, and avoid war. During the imbroglio, Carranza greatly expanded the financial support of his principal newspapers. By June, for example, he raised the monthly subsidies for *La Raza* in San Antonio and *El Progreso* in Laredo to \$1,120 and \$1,000, respectively.<sup>26</sup>

Two weeks after Villa's raid, in an effort to counter negative publicity and criticism of his inability to control the border region, Carranza appointed Luis Bossero to head the Mexican Bureau of Information in the United States.<sup>27</sup> Bossero, a former lieutenant colonel in the Constitutionalist army with experience both in the PANS and Bureau agencies at Veracruz, established his headquarters in Washington, D.C. Bernard Gallant, an American

<sup>25</sup> Andrés G. García to Eliseo Arredondo, El Paso, Texas, 10 Enero 1916, L-E-810(2), AHSRE, 161.

<sup>26</sup> V. Carranza to Juan T. Burns, México, D.F., 30 Junio 1916, Telegramas de Venustiano Carranza, Fondo XXI-4, Centro de Estudios de Historia de México, Fundación Cultural de Conumex, México, D.F. (hereafter cited as TVC).

<sup>27</sup> Cándido Aguilar to Eliseo Arredondo, Querétaro, 25 Marzo 1916, Expediente 1-17-35, AHSRE, p. 1.

journalist and Bureau employee, assumed control of the New York office. Daniel Dillon, a New York reporter who had worked with Pesqueira, and George F. Weeks, a North American who had been with Carranza since the beginning of the Constitutionalist revolution, headed the Veracruz and Mexico City offices.<sup>28</sup>

Under Bossero's direction, the Mexican Bureau of Information, later renamed the Mexican News Bureau, abandoned the pretext of independence from the Mexican government. Indeed, it now functioned openly as an official public relations office. Bossero's responsibilities did, however, include a number of typical duties. He coordinated the exchange and publication of news and information and supervised the preparation of articles both for English- and Spanish-language publications. He arranged for members of the Washington and New York agencies to conduct speaking tours and publicity campaigns and organized groups of United States journalists to make escorted trips to Mexico. In addition, Bossero hired public figures sympathetic to the Revolution, such as Lincoln Steffens, to speak on behalf of Mexico. Bossero also distributed photographs and official statistics demonstrating progress in school construction, health care, social programs, industrial production, and mining operations. This type of information, he noted, was especially vital, because "Americans were more interested in facts than words."<sup>29</sup>

In November 1916, Bossero sent Gallant to Mexico for an in-depth interview with Carranza. He also arranged for Gallant to write an extensive article on the opening of the Constitutional Convention in Querétaro for the *New York Times* and to submit daily news reports on the convention and other important Mexican events to the Associated Press. Bossero believed that such positive reporting would help counteract the negative news that dominated the North American press after Villa's raid.<sup>30</sup> During this time, *carrancistas* again condemned reporters working for the Hearst chain for their false, libelous, interventionist, "yellow journalism." In retaliation, Carranza ordered the expulsion of a number of correspondents, including

<sup>28</sup> M. Dávalos to Gerzayn Ugarte, Veracruz, 18 Junio 1915, VC, doc. 4622; Acuerdo del Primer Jefe, Querétaro, 31 Marzo 1916, Expediente 3-8-48, AHSRE, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, New York, 1 Mayo 1916, VC, doc. 8280; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, Washington, D.C., 2 Junio 1916, VC, doc. 8993; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, 7 Junio 1916, VC, doc. 9127; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, Washington, D.C., 25 Junio 1916, VC, doc. 9593.

<sup>30</sup> Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, New York, 8 Noviembre 1916, VC, doc. 11663; Eliseo Arredondo to Cándido Aguilar, 9 Noviembre 1916, VC, doc. 11883.



Daniel Dillon, the Mexican News Bureau official in Veracruz, who was caught sending confidential information to Hearst's Chicago *Examiner*.<sup>31</sup>

Despite his efforts, Bossero's work did not escape criticism from fellow *carrancistas* in the United States. Rolland complained that the Bureau was ineffective and discredited because many journalists doubted the reliability of the information it produced. Juan T. Burns, Consul General in New York, charged that Bossero neglected his duties, seldom visited the Bureau office, and apparently did little to earn his salary.<sup>32</sup>

Burns's complaints were unjustified; in fact, Bossero was a highly visible, and, at times, uninhibited defender of Mexico. His hectic schedule included a successful speaking tour of forty-two North American colleges as well as public appearances in New York, Buffalo, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Baltimore, and elsewhere. One of Bossero's speeches received an enthusiastic reception from 3500 workers at a Socialist rally in Carnegie Hall. He sent a Mexican delegation to an assembly of the American Union Against Militarism, which was meeting in El Paso to protest the Punitive Expedition. Bossero often responded publicly to the attacks of interventionists such as Albert B. Fall, and he supervised the publication of thousands of copies of his most effective speeches for distribution to schools, libraries, public officials, and private citizens. He even proposed extending the propaganda campaign to Latin America and Europe, an endeavor that ultimately did achieve some positive results.<sup>33</sup>

Given the strained relations between Mexico and the United States, Mexican Ambassador Eliseo Arredondo suggested that Bossero transfer his office from Washington to New York, thus distancing himself from the legation. Arredondo feared that Bossero's impulsiveness would further exacerbate the tense diplomatic relations between the two nations. He also ordered

<sup>31</sup> Acuerdo del Primer Jefe, México, D.F., 8 Junio 1916, Expediente 9-4-114, AHSRE, p. 1; Daniel G. Lamadrid to Cándido Aguilar, México, D.F., 10 Julio 1916, Expediente 9-4-114, AHSRE, p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Modesto Rolland to Venustiano Carranza, New York, 3 Agosto 1916, VC, doc. 10118; Juan T. Burns to Venustiano Carranza, New York, 3 Noviembre 1916, Expediente 1-17-35, AHSRE, 62.

<sup>33</sup> *Philadelphia Evening Telegram*, 26 May 1916; *Baltimore Sun*, 28 May 1916; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, Washington, D.C., 2 Junio 1916, VC, doc. 8993; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, Washington, D.C., 25 Junio 1916, VC, doc. 9593; Cándido Aguilar to Eliseo Arredondo, 29 Junio 1916, VC, doc. 9651; *New York Evening Post*, 7 Julio 1916; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, New York, 11 Agosto 1916, VC, doc. 10210; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, 22 Septiembre 1916, VC, doc. 10867; Luis Bossero to Cándido Aguilar, New York, 25 Octubre 1916, VC, doc. 11404. For an overview of *carrancista* propaganda efforts outside the United States and their relative success, see Douglas W. Richmond, *Venustiano Carranza's Nationalist Struggle*, pp. 190-192, and 212-217.



Bossero to submit frequent reports to the embassy in order to avert any potential embarrassments.<sup>34</sup>

Perhaps to provide closer day-to-day management of Bureau affairs, in July 1916 Carranza transferred George F. Weeks from Mexico City to head the Bureau office in Washington. Weeks, a former San Francisco journalist, had become acquainted with the First Chief after settling in Carranza's hometown of Cuatro Ciénegas, Coahuila, before the *maderista* revolt. After Carranza launched his own movement, Weeks accompanied him on his campaigns, served as a field man for the New York *Herald*, and, at the same time, acted as Carranza's publicity agent. He had worked in the Bureau offices in Veracruz and Mexico City and enjoyed Carranza's confidence and respect.<sup>35</sup>

Weeks' established the Mexican News Bureau office in the Riggs Building, conveniently located a few floors below the prestigious National Press Club, of which he was a member. He performed the now-routine functions of the Bureau chief—writing articles and press releases, overseeing operation of the wire service, and disseminating a wide variety of information related to Mexican political, economic, social, and cultural affairs. The centerpiece of Weeks' promotional endeavors was the *Mexican Review*. The *Mexican Review* was an attractively-designed, illustrated monthly magazine dedicated to providing information on matters of interest to both Mexicans and North Americans "who wish[ed] to have the truth about Mexico known." Weeks edited the journal, and George L. Edmunds, a New York journalist employed by the Bureau, served as publisher.<sup>36</sup>

Information cabled from Veracruz to the Washington legation and items extracted from friendly newspapers comprised the principal sources of the magazine's content. Articles that effectively explained the government's policy of national reconstruction or discussed the reformation of Mexican laws received special attention. The magazine openly advertized itself as an

<sup>34</sup> Eliseo Arredondo to Cándido Aguilar, Washington, D.C., 10 Julio 1916, VC, doc. 9794.

<sup>35</sup> Miguel E. Diebold to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, El Paso, Texas, 12 Noviembre 1913, L-E-760, AHSRE, p. 1; Turner, *Bullets, Bottles, and Gardenias*, p. 93; George F. Weeks to Venustiano Carranza, Washington, D.C., 16 Noviembre 1916, VC, doc. 11807; George F. Weeks to Venustiano Carranza, Veracruz, 2 Diciembre 1914, VC, doc. 2176; George F. Weeks to Ramón P. De Negri, Washington, D.C., 31 Junio 1917, Expediente 17-6-299, AHSRE, p. 4; Secretario de Estado del Exterior to Ignacio Bonillas, México, D.F., 22 Mayo 1917, "George T.[sic] Weeks. Su Expediente personal," 1-19-61, AHSRE, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> *Mexican Review*, I:6, p.1. A nearly complete set of the *Mexican Review* may be found in the Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin.

official propaganda organ, and clearly intended to “place Mexico in a proper light before the world.”<sup>37</sup> The *Mexican Review* encouraged subscriptions, but it began with a mailing list of 15,000 that included community and college libraries, newspaper exchange services, public officials, and private citizens. Those on the original mailing list continued to receive the magazine whether or not they purchased subscriptions.<sup>38</sup>

George F. Weeks continued to head the Mexican News Bureau after Carranza’s formal assumption of the presidency in May 1917, and he remained the central figure in Mexican propaganda activities in the United States throughout Carranza’s regime. Although tensions had eased somewhat after the Punitive Expedition withdrew in February, relations between the two nations, further complicated by the United States’ entry into World War I, remained fragile. Critics of the Constitutionalist government condemned provisions of the newly-promulgated Constitution of 1917 that threatened the financial interests of foreign property owners; they denounced the recurring violence and loss of life in Mexico, and accused Carranza of pro-German sympathies. Many leading North American newspapers increased their anti-Mexico rhetoric. The negative and interventionist posture of the Hearst Press so angered Carranza that in May 1918 he ordered the Director of the Mexican Postal Service to stop any Hearst publications from entering the country.<sup>39</sup>

Under the circumstances, Carranza could not relax his efforts to promote his government and defend its program of reconstruction and reform. He continued the subvention of dozens of Spanish-language papers throughout the borderlands and spurred Weeks and the Mexican News Bureau staff to redouble their efforts. Weeks cultivated personal contacts with North American journalists; replied to newspaper articles critical of Mexico; encouraged potential investors; published and distributed Mexican government decrees, especially those related to the petroleum industry; and supplied public officials, labor organizations, and news services with a wide range of political, economic, and cultural material regarding Mexico. He also instituted a

<sup>37</sup> *Mexican Review*, I:6, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup> Testimony of George L. Edmunds, IMA, 1:423-426.

<sup>39</sup> The banned publications included the *New York Evening Journal*, *New York American*, *Deutsches Journal* (New York), *Boston American*, *Chicago Examiner*, *San Francisco Examiner*, *Los Angeles Examiner*, *Los Angeles Herald*, *Atlanta American*, *Atlanta Georgian*, *Orchard and Farm*, *Cosmopolitan*, *Harper’s*, *Hearst’s*, *Good Housekeeping*, *Motor*, and *Motor Boating*; Cándido Aguilar to Cosme Hinojosa, México, D.F., 11 Mayo 1918, Expediente 18-1-58, AHSRE, p. 6.

regular news bulletin service for North American reporters and oversaw the production and distribution of the *Mexican Review*.<sup>40</sup>

In March 1918, Weeks temporarily suspended publication of the *Mexican Review* and transferred the headquarters of the Mexican News Bureau to Mexico City. Robert H. Murray, a long-time Mexico City correspondent for the New York *Herald*, had been appointed Director of the Mexico City office of the United States Committee on Public Information (CPI), and Murray had invited Weeks to join his staff. In a highly unique arrangement, Weeks continued to direct the Mexican News Bureau and, at the same time, managed the editorial department of the United States government's own propaganda organization in Mexico. As CPI editor, Weeks prepared daily and weekly news bulletins, which Carranza permitted the organization to distribute throughout Mexico free of charge via the national postal service. Apparently in return for Carranza's cooperation, and recognizing that North Americans' misunderstanding of Mexico was partially to blame for problems between the two nations, the United States government allowed Weeks to undertake one of the CPI's most unusual projects. Between October 3, 1918, and January 30, 1919, Weeks produced an English-language newsletter, in essence, an official bulletin of the Mexican government, for distribution throughout the United States.<sup>41</sup>

After World War I ended and the CPI office in Mexico City closed, Weeks turned his full attention to running the Mexican News Bureau, and in April 1919, he revived the *Mexican Review*. He increased the magazine's length and enhanced its quality of production. Most significantly, however, he transformed the journal into a bilingual publication, with one page printed in English and the facing page in Spanish. While its essential purpose, format, and character remained the same, the *Mexican Review/Revista Mexicana* could now reach a larger and more diverse audience in the United States. The Mexican News Bureau, the *Mexican Review/Revista Mexicana*, and the principal *carrancista* newspapers in the United States continued to serve the Constitutionalist government and defend its program until the Carranza regime collapsed in May 1920. Perhaps confirming both the value and effectiveness of Carranza's propaganda organization, the men who drove him from power appropriated those same institutions to promote their own administrations in the United States.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> "George F. Weeks. Su solicitud con motivo de los gastos que eroga en la propaganda de la Revista Mexicana que se edita en Washington." 1922. Expediente 17-6-290, AHSRE, p. 1.

<sup>41</sup> James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, *Words That Won The War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 245, 329.

<sup>42</sup> *Mexican Review/Revista Mexicana*, III:1 (April 1919): 1; "George F. Weeks. Su solicitud con

From the inception of the Constitutionalist revolution, propaganda played a substantial role in Venustiano Carranza's diplomatic strategy. Promoting his cause north of the Río Bravo was given high priority. He persistently, aggressively, and systematically pursued that objective and devoted a significant portion of his relatively limited financial resources to achieve the desired results. In many respects, the organization, techniques, and sophistication of *carrancista* activities in the print media of the United States compared favorably with the overseas propaganda efforts of England, Germany, and other countries during the era of World War I, and they antedated similar international endeavors by the Committee on Public Information after the United States entered the conflict. Propaganda became an integral part of the wartime strategy of all major participants of the Great War; the amount of human and material resources they devoted to influencing foreign public opinion between 1914 and 1920 was unprecedented.<sup>43</sup>

Although the international propaganda operations of the European powers varied somewhat in structure, leadership, and distribution of responsibility, they were usually undertaken by experienced journalists and coordinated through their foreign offices. Like the *carrancistas*, both the English and the Germans relied heavily upon the international telegraph and cable facilities to transmit information to overseas news agencies; they established foreign press bureaus and issued news bulletins through their own information services. Similarly, they produced and distributed books, magazines, pamphlets, and photographs that placed their nations in a favorable light; founded periodicals; supplied news items to papers that could not afford to subscribe to the major wire services; disseminated materials to civic, ethnic, and educational organizations; funded speakers; and sponsored conferences to promote their cause.<sup>44</sup>

Between 1917 and 1919, the United States Committee on Public Information, in effect, a separate propaganda ministry under the leadership of George Creel, established offices in allied and neutral nations. As noted previously, the Carranza government allowed the CPI office in Mexico City to undertake freely a variety of activities designed to counteract German sympathies and propaganda south of the Río Bravo. In many respects, CPI

motivo de los gastos que eroga en la propaganda de la Revista Mexicana que se edita en Washington." 1922. Expediente 17-6-290, AHSRE, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> For an introduction to the role of propaganda during the era of World War I, see Mock and Larson, *Words That Won The War*; Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: Peter Smith, 1933); and George Creel, *How We Advertised America* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1920).

<sup>44</sup> Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, pp. 14-46.

operations in Mexico—the establishment of an information service, production of an official newspaper, dissemination of news bulletins and other data throughout the country, the distribution of books, pamphlets, and photographs, and the employment of speakers—paralleled organizations and procedures that *carrancistas* had already instituted in the United States. Although *carrancistas* failed to exploit the new medium of motion pictures as North Americans and Europeans did, the creation of such enterprises as Pesqueira's PANS confirms their vision, inventiveness, and zeal.<sup>45</sup>

The formation, development, and maintenance of an international propaganda apparatus under the existing circumstances constitutes truly a remarkable accomplishment and further demonstrates that the Constitutionalists possessed organizational skills far superior to those of their rivals. After late 1914, Carranza's virtually unchallenged control of dozens of Mexican consulates in the United States gave him a notable advantage in terms of visibility and legitimacy, strategic bases of operation, and income to finance his activities. No other Mexican faction attempted to build an organization as extensive, complex, or costly as the *carrancista* enterprise. Even though Carranza's foes, particularly Pancho Villa, established newspapers, hired press agents, bribed reporters and editors, and manipulated the media to promote their image and agenda, none ever matched the *carrancistas*' capacity to initiate systematic, coordinated campaigns—in English and Spanish—at the national and international level.<sup>46</sup>

Carranza's exploitation of the print media in the United States contributed to the overall success of his diplomatic initiatives. *Carrancistas* effectively manipulated the press to discredit Huerta and mobilize opposition to his regime among North Americans and Mexican expatriates. Gaining *de facto* recognition from the Wilson administration in 1915 was both a diplomatic and public relations coup. The *carrancista* propaganda machine served to counteract negative publicity, promote and defend the Constitutionalist agenda, and champion Carranza's interests among the expatriate community. The avoidance of war during the crisis following Villa's raid on Columbus and the winning of *de jure* recognition for his government in 1917 suggest further positive results of *carrancista* propaganda activities in the United States.

Before we can fully understand and assess the impact of *carrancista*

<sup>45</sup> Mock and Larson, *Words That Won The War*, pp. 235-247, 321-331.

<sup>46</sup> For a study of Villa's use of the mass media in the United States, see Mark Anderson, "Revolution by Headlines: Mass Media in the Foreign Policy of Francisco 'Pancho' Villa" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Riverside, in progress). Personal correspondence with the author, 16 February 1995.

propaganda upon specifically targeted groups or its influence on the course of U.S.-Mexican diplomatic relations, further study is necessary. Such investigation, however, should provide greater insight into the role that the mass media played in the relationship between the two nations, enhance our appreciation of the international dimensions and ramifications of the Mexican Revolution, and, perhaps, assist in clarifying many still-nebulous aspects of United States-Mexican diplomatic relations during the revolutionary era.

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